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After the coup attempt on 15 July
2016, more than 80,000 people
have been detained in Turkey. One
of the most interesting incidents
was undoubtedly the arrest of
International Residual Mechanism
for Criminal Tribunals’ (MICT)
(former) Judge Aydın Sefa Akay.
The main problem in this situation
was whether Judge Akay enjoyed
diplomatic immunity even from his
own State’s jurisdiction.
Summary of the Events
In 2011, Judge Akay was nominated by Turkey and elected by the UN General Assembly
as a judge of MICT, which was established by the United Nations Security Council
Resolution No:1966 in 2010 to finish the work begun by the International Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). He
worked remotely for MICT and on 25 July 2016, he was appointed to a panel assembled to
determine whether new evidence showed Augustin Ngirabatware The Prosecutor v.
Augustin Ngirabatware, MICT-12-29-R, the former Rwandan Minister of Planning, who was
sentenced to 30 years of imprisonment for committing genocide, had been wrongfully
convicted.
On 21 September 2016, Judge Akay was arrested and detained on charges of being a
member of the “Fetullahist Terrorist Organization” (FETO), which the government accused
of orchestrating the coup attempt of 15 July 2016.He has been accused of attempting to
abolish Constitutional order in Turkey.
Following the request made by the Mechanism’s President on 5 October 2016, the UN
asserted diplomatic immunity to the Turkish Government and requested Judge Akay’s
release and the cessation of legal proceedings against him so that he may resume his
functions for the Mechanism.
On 31 January 2017 the Mechanism ordered the Turkish Government to cease all legal
proceedings against Judge Akay and release him from detention by no later than
14 February 2017. On 9 March 2017, the President of the Mechanism notified the United
Nations Security Council of the failure of the Government of Turkey to comply with the 31
January 2017 order and release Judge Akay. On 10 March 2017, Turkey’s permanent
representative to the UN responded to the notification sent by the President of the
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Mechanism on March 9, 2018, stating that “the charges against Mr. Akay are in no way
related to his functions as a judge of the Mechanism. On that basis, we have already
brought our views to the attention of the Secretariat, based on the applicable legal
instruments, including article 29 of the statute of the Mechanism, according to which Mr.
Akay does not enjoy immunity before the Turkish judicial authorities for acts performed
outside the framework of his assignment under the Mechanism. The relevant provisions of
these legal instruments also confirm that immunities cannot be construed as a basis to
develop or promote impunity or to impede the course of justice.”
Despite the fact that the UN has formally asserted diplomatic immunity, he was convicted
on 14 July 2017, on a single charge of being a member of a terrorist organization and
sentenced to seven years and six months imprisonment and has been provisionally
released under judicial supervision, with restrictions on travel. The decision will become
final if the higher court upholds the decision and he would then be detained again.
Following his provisional release from detention pending his appeal, he resumed work for
the Mechanism remotely. However, Judge Akay was not reappointed by the Secretary
General of UN and as of 3 July 2018 he is not a member of the Mechanism.
Remarks
Throughout the case, the most topical matter was the diplomatic immunity of Judge Akay.
Undoubtedly, Turkey has an exclusive authority to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over
Judge Akay for the alleged crimes. The question here was whether the diplomatic immunity
enjoyed by Judge Akay genuinely impede the exercise of Turkey’s jurisdiction.
Two different approaches have been raised about Judge Akay’s immunity: the UN asserted
diplomatic immunity to Judge Akay pursuant to the MICT Statute and the Convention on
the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations and Its Agents, to which Turkey is also
party; Turkey, on the other hand, argued that he was only accorded functional
immunity.What makes it so controversial was the fact that the extent of the rules governing
the immunity of MICT judges (and international judges in general) were not explicitly
provided. Even though it is generally accepted that international judges enjoy diplomatic
privileges and immunities, their immunities are not identical in all respects. This difference
arises from the characteristics of the international personality of the entity on behalf of
whom they act.
International organizations have neither a territory nor a population and they must exercise
their functions in member state’s territories through the agents who are nationals of the
member states. Therefore, availability of diplomatic immunity of international judges
becomes more significant when they fulfill their function in their own State of
nationality For discussions see Jenks, International Immunities, at 37 ff.; Kreiker,
Völkerrechtliche Exemtionen Band 2, at 953 ff.; Koster, Immunität internationaler Richter, at
227 ff., as is the case of Judge Akay.
In order to determine the scope of the immunity of Judge Akay’s immunity from Turkey’s
jurisdiction, it is necessary to look at the rules governing the immunity of MICT judges.
Article 29 of the MICT Statute stipulates that “[t]he Convention on the Privileges and
Immunities of the United Nations of 13 February 1946 shall apply to the Mechanism, the
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archives of the ICTY, the ICTR and the Mechanism, the judges, the Prosecutor and his or
her staff, and the Registrar and his or her staff.”It further states that “the judges of the
Mechanism shall enjoy the same privileges and immunities, exemptions and facilities
accorded to the President, the Prosecutor and the Registrar when engaged on the
business of the Mechanism.” The phrase “when engaged on the business of the
Mechanism” reflects the functional structure of the court. The Mechanism has a roster of 25
judges. For the cost-saving purposes, according to Art. 8/3 of the MICT Statute, the judges
exercise their functions remotely, unless the President of the Mechanism decides
otherwise. Neither the Statute of the Mechanism, nor the Convention on the Privileges and
Immunities of the United Nations and Its Agents (General Convention) contain a rule
relating the availability of immunity if the judges discharge their functions in their own
states. Besides, the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR) set forth a rule
regarding diplomatic agents who are nationals of the receiving state. According to art. 38 of
the VCDR, a diplomatic agent enjoys only immunity ratione materiae in the receiving state
if she/he is a national or a permanent resident of the receiving state. Nevertheless, Art. 38/2
imposes an obligation on the receiving state that it “must exercise its jurisdiction over those
persons in such a manner as not to interfere unduly with the performance of the functions
of the mission.”
The question is, whether art. 38 of the VCDR is also applicable to MICT judges in their
home country where they engage in the business of the court remotely. The answer is not
affirmative. The reasons why this rule is not applicable to MICT judge are as follows:
First, if it is generally accepted that article 38 is applicable ipso facto to the immunity of
international judges as well, it would be unnecessary and illogical to include specific
provisions in the agreements concluded between the host states and international courts
where the courts are located for limiting the immunity of judges who are citizens of the host
states. (See for example Art. 18 of the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea)
Secondly, it is accepted that the judges of the Mechanism have an equal status with the
senior officials of the UN (Assistant Secretary-General and above) whose immunities were
provided in Section V Art. 19 of the General Convention on the Immunities and Privileges of
the UN. (See Bandyopadhyay and Iwata, Article V Sections 17-21 General Convention, in
August Reinisch/Perter Bachmayer (eds), The Convention on the Privileges and
Immunities of the United Nations and its Specialized Agencies, Oxford University Press
2016, p.373). Therefore, their immunity is not restricted to the states in which they are
discharging their functions. Rather, their immunities are applicable in all states, including
their own.
Finally, should a limitation on the applicability of diplomatic immunity of MICT judges with
states other than their own be intended, art. 29 of the MICT would have been formulated in
a similar vein to the UN officials immunity conferred in Section V art. 18 of the General
Convention.
Concluding remarks
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Turkey’s main intention in arresting Judge Akay was most probably neither to jeopardize
the administration of international justice nor to intervene in the functioning of MICT. The
main focus of the governmental authorities in Turkey after the attempted coup has been
arresting or dismissing from public service anyone suspected of being linked to FETO.
Considering all the events that transpired in Turkey in the aftermath of 15 July 2016, it was
unlikely to expect that the diplomatic immunities of an international judge, who was
believed to be a member of FETO, would be granted.
On the other hand, Turkey’s refusal to recognize the diplomatic immunity of Judge Akay,
even if in the state’s best interests, might have chilling effects on judicial independence.
That is not to say that Turkey must refrain from trying Judge Akay before its courts no
matter what. It would have been more appropriate to request from the UN to waive Judge
Akay’s immunity, so that it would be more respectful to international rules on the one hand,
and an evasion of any misleading implementation on the other.
As Judge Meron observed “international criminal tribunals are fully dependent both on the
cooperation of States and on States’ respect for the international legal framework
applicable to such institutions. Without such cooperation and respect, international courts
cannot ensure their independent operation, wherever around the world court functions may
be exercised, and they therefore cannot carry out the vital mandates entrusted to them.”
What was more surprising and confusing was that Judge Akay was not reappointed to
MICT. This is a backwards step for the international criminal justice system, as it reveals
how open it could be for state intervention — including the carrying out of mock trials—and
how easy it could be for states to intervene in international courts’ structure, and even
worse, to jeopardize the administration of justice.
In the end, what happened with Judge Akay has manifested the deficiency of international
rules regarding the immunity of international judges and, moreover, that said rules must be
so articulated that they leave no room for similar incidents in the future.
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